



Abstract

Goal: Explain the meaning and distribution of *a good* as a numeral modifier, as in (1)

- (1) John read a good ten books.

Proposal:

- *A good* conveys that the speaker believes the quantity expressed is
 - ‘a lot’
 - likely
- These can conflict with contributions of other modifiers to restrict its distribution
- *A good* is a parameterized determiner, which further limits its distribution

Puzzle

Q: Why does *a good* give rise to the felicity pattern in (2)?

- (2) a. John read about a good ten books.
b. John read at least a good ten books.
c. #John read at most a good ten books.
d. ?John read more than a good ten books.
e. #John read less than a good ten books.

- Naive theory: *a good* $n = \geq n$

- But this doesn’t reflect the pattern in (2)
(e.g. (2b) doesn’t seem redundant, cf. *John read at least at least ten books*)

• **Proposed theory:**

- *A good* expresses that the speaker thinks the quantity expressed is ‘a lot’ – $\#x \geq d_s$
- It also expresses that the speaker thinks the quantity expressed is likely – $\Box \#x = d$
(\Box here represents human necessity (Kratzer, 1981), i.e. true in all closest accessible worlds)

More on distribution

- In some ways, *a good* has a similar distribution to *at least*

- (3) David is {at least/a good} 6 feet tall(er than Kate).

- But *a good* requires a quantity to directly modify, while *at least* is more flexible

- (4) David is {at least/*a good} tall.
(5) John read ten books, {at least/*a good}.
(6) John read {at least/*a good} about ten books.
(7) John read about {*at least/a good} ten books.

• **Proposed theory:**

- *A good* is a parameterized determiner (Hackl, 2000)
- It therefore requires a degree argument and it can be modified by degree modifiers (e.g. *at least*, *about*) but cannot modify them

Hackl summary


- Accounts for attested differences between quantifiers (all treated the same under a standard Generalized Quantifier approach) by decomposing them into combinations of parameterized determiners (e.g. (null) *many*) and degree modifiers (e.g. *at least*)
- NB - *at least* is a degree modifier, I claim that *a good* is a parameterized determiner

Analysis

- Desiderata
- Account for the pattern in (2)
 - Account for distribution in (3)-(7)

Semantics

- I treat *a good* as a parameterized determiner (Hackl, 2000) with two presuppositions
 - that the speaker believes the quantity expressed is ‘a lot’ (meets some salient threshold, $\#x \geq d_s$)
 - that the speaker believes the quantity expressed is likely ($\Box \#x = d$)



- i. $\llbracket \mathbf{a\ good} \rrbracket = \lambda d_{Card}. \lambda f_{\langle et \rangle}. \lambda g_{\langle et \rangle}. \exists x : \#x \geq d_s \ \& \ \Box \#x = d \ [f(x) \ \& \ g(x) \ \& \ x \text{ has } d\text{-many parts in } f]$
ii. $\llbracket \mathbf{a\ good\ } d \rrbracket = \lambda f_{\langle et \rangle}. \lambda g_{\langle et \rangle}. \exists x : \#x \geq d_s \ \& \ \Box \#x = d \ [f(x) \ \& \ g(x) \ \& \ x \text{ has } d\text{-many parts in } f]$
iii. $\llbracket \mathbf{a\ good\ } d \ \mathbf{books} \rrbracket = \lambda g_{\langle et \rangle}. \exists x : \#x \geq d_s \ \& \ \Box \#x = d \ [book(x) \ \& \ g(x) \ \& \ x \text{ has } d\text{-many parts in } book]$
iv. $\llbracket \mathbf{John\ read\ a\ good\ } d \ \mathbf{books} \rrbracket = \exists x : \#x \geq d_s \ \& \ \Box \#x = d \ [book(x) \ \& \ read(j, x) \ \& \ x \text{ has } d\text{-many parts in } book]$
v. $\llbracket \mathbf{at\ least\ ten} \rrbracket = \lambda D_{\langle dt \rangle}. \Box D(10) \ \& \ \Diamond [\exists m > 10 : D(m)]$ (cf. Geurts and Nouwen, 2007)
 $\llbracket \mathbf{at\ most\ ten} \rrbracket = \lambda D_{\langle dt \rangle}. \Diamond D(10) \ \& \ \neg \Diamond [\exists m > 10 : D(m)]$
 $\llbracket \mathbf{more\ than\ ten} \rrbracket = \lambda D_{\langle dt \rangle}. \#(\lambda n. D(n)) > 10$
 $\llbracket \mathbf{less\ than\ ten} \rrbracket = \lambda D_{\langle dt \rangle}. \#(\lambda n. D(n)) < 10$
vi. $\llbracket \mathbf{(2b)} \rrbracket = \Box [\Box x : \#x \geq d_s \ \& \ \Box \#x = 10 \ [book(x) \ \& \ read(j, x) \ \& \ x \text{ has } 10\text{-many parts in } book]] \ \& \ \Diamond [\exists m > 10 [\Box x : \#x \geq d_s \ \& \ \Box \#x = m \ [book(x) \ \& \ read(j, x) \ \& \ x \text{ has } m\text{-many parts in } book]]]$
 $\llbracket \mathbf{(2c)} \rrbracket = \Box [\Box x : \#x \geq d_s \ \& \ \Box \#x = 10 \ [book(x) \ \& \ read(j, x) \ \& \ x \text{ has } 10\text{-many parts in } book]] \ \& \ \neg \Diamond [\exists m > 10 [\Box x : \#x \geq d_s \ \& \ \Box \#x = m \ [book(x) \ \& \ read(j, x) \ \& \ x \text{ has } m\text{-many parts in } book]]]$
 $\llbracket \mathbf{(2d)} \rrbracket = \#(\lambda n. [\Box x : \#x \geq d_s \ \& \ \Box \#x = n \ [book(x) \ \& \ read(j, x) \ \& \ x \text{ has } n\text{-many parts in } book]]) \geq 10$
 $\llbracket \mathbf{(2e)} \rrbracket = \#(\lambda n. [\Box x : \#x \geq d_s \ \& \ \Box \#x = n \ [book(x) \ \& \ read(j, x) \ \& \ x \text{ has } n\text{-many parts in } book]]) < 10$

Patterns in (2): (2c)-(2e) highlight $\neq 10$, conflicts with $\Box \#x = 10$

- < 10 is highlighted in (2c), (2e) (cf. $\Box 10$ in *at least*)

- > 10 is highlighted in (2d)

This pattern holds for other modifiers as well:

- other prominently negative modifiers are infelicitous

- (9) #barely a good ten (cf. Fortunately, John is barely sick)

- non-prominently negative modifiers (Nouwen, 2006) are felicitous

- (10) almost a good ten (cf. #Fortunately, John is almost sick)

Patterns in (3)-(7):

- *a good* is a parameterized determiner
 - Takes a cardinality – *(4), *(5)
 - Can be modified by degree modifiers like *at least*, *about* – (7)
 - Cannot modify degree modifiers – *(6)

Evaluativity

- *A good* does not indicate that the speaker considers the argument to be ‘good’ (cf. (11))

- (11) I’ve been sick a good two weeks now, and I’ve hated every second.

- Same can be seen with adverb *well*

- (12) He got here {well/a good while} after ten o’clock. (Bolinger, 1972, p. 37)

- Other evaluatives contribute a more transparent meaning
e.g. *astounding* \rightarrow high degree of ‘astounding’-ness

- (13) a. The game was an astonishing four minutes/hours long.
b. The game was astonishingly long/short.

- *Good and* bridges the gap – has an ‘a lot’ (‘thoroughly’) component like *a good*, also seems transparently *good*, indicating that the speaker is pleased

- (14) {%Our prank made Chris/#That prank made me} good and irritated.

- (15) That {jerk/#sweetheart} is good and dead.

- I treat the non-at-issue contributions of *a good* as presuppositions, but this kind of expressive content is usually in the CI domain (Potts, 2003)
 - Under most tests, *a good* does not pattern straight-forwardly as either
 - *A good* also has a more grammaticalized non-at-issue contribution

Conclusions

Summary

- *A good* is a Hackl-style parameterized determiner
 - *A good* has the same distribution as a parameterized determiner – it must modify a quantity (e.g. *ten books*) and it can be modified by degree modifiers (e.g. *about*, *at least*), but it cannot modify degree modifiers
- *A good* expresses that the speaker believes that the quantity in question is ‘a lot’ and that it is likely
 - *A good* is not felicitous with modifiers that conflict with this possibility component, whether by having a salient $<$ component (e.g. *at most*, *less than*, *barely*) or a salient $>$ component (e.g. *more than*)

Bigger questions

Q: What is the nature of quantifiers?

- This provides further support for a Hackl-style analysis

Q: What is the nature of conventional implicatures?

- This provides further support that it is not a uniform category

Remaining questions

Q: How does data like (16) and (17) fit in to this analysis?

- (16) John read a good deal of books.

- (17) John read a good many books.

Q: What relation does this have to nominal modifier?

- (18) I like a good book.

References

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