STAGE-LEVEL EVALUATIVITY IS DESIDERATIVITY*

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1 Introduction

This paper seeks to explain a systematic alternation in which evaluative predicates (cf. Lasersohn, 2005, Stephenson, 2007) in English become desiderative predicates in the presence of the modal *would*, as shown in (1) and (2).

(1) a. Sandra likes John's watch. (evaluative)
b. Sandra would like John's watch. (desiderative)

(2) a. Cookies are great. (evaluative)
b. Cookies would be great. (desiderative)

Note that the class of evaluatives is syntactically heterogeneous, containing both verbal and adjectival predicates. In (1), the predicate is the evaluative verb *(would) like*, there is an explicit attitude holder in the subject *Sandra*, and the object of evaluation is the direct object *John's watch*. In (2), with the adjectival evaluative predicate *(would) be great*, the grammatical subject *cookies* is the object of evaluation, and the attitude holder is understood to be the speaker.[1]

As their name suggests, evaluative predicates convey an attitude holder's opinion of an object of evaluation. Evaluatives can be both positive, e.g. *like*, and negative, e.g. *hate*, though we focus the discussion on the positive evaluatives. Similarly, desiderative predicates convey that the attitude holder desires the object. Desiderative predicates include *want* and *wish*.

What we see in (1) and (2) is that the same lexical items that convey Sandra's positive disposition towards John's watch, (1a), or the speaker's positive disposition towards cookies, (2a),

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[1]It seems the attitude holder is the individual that fills the *source* discourse role (Sells, 1987). In unembedded contexts this is the speaker, but when these propositions are embedded under verbs of saying or thinking the matrix subject fills this role.

(i) John thinks that cookies are great.

combine with the modal *would* to convey that Sandra desires John's watch, (2a), and that the speaker desires cookies, (2b).

In what follows we show that this alternation conditioned on the modal auxiliary encompasses not only the noted change in meaning from evaluative to desiderative, but also differences in complement selection. As an aid to exposition, these aspects of the alternation will be summarized throughout this paper in a running table, (3).

(3) Evaluative/desiderative summary 1

predicate:	*like*	*would like*	*want*
1. conveys	evaluation	desire	desire

One important aspect of the alternation is that, while the evaluatives are individual-level predicates, the desideratives are stage-level. This distinction, we argue, is crucial. Our analysis derives desiderativity from a specific segmenting of the temporal extent of evaluative predicates, that is: Desiderativity results when an evaluative is stage level.

Next, we look in turn at complement selection, a recent analysis of the desiderative predicate *want* due to Villalta (2008), the generic properties of evaluatives, and a compositional analysis of evaluatives with and without the modal *would*.

2 Complements

Evaluative predicates can take a range of complements including nominals, gerundives, infinitival clauses, ECM-clauses, *that*-clauses, and *for*-clauses. Examples of these complement types are shown in (4)-(8).

(4) Nominals:

a. Sandra likes cookies.
b. Apples are amazing.[2]

(5) Gerundives:

a. David enjoys going to the store.
b. Skydiving is exhilarating.

(6) Infinitival clauses:

a. Julian hates to say goodbye.
b. It's fun to ride rollercoasters.

(7) ECM-clauses (Acc+Inf):[3]

a. Rachel likes Sandra to cook dinner.
b. *

(8) *That*-clauses:

[2]Some implicit attitude holder constructions allow or even require dummy subjects, cf. **It's amazing apples*, *#It's exhilarating skydiving*, *?To ride rollercoasters is fun*, *#That you came is great*. When a dummy subject is used, this appears to be a consequence of prosodic weight.

[3]This complement type is restricted to certain verbal evaluatives. The adjectival construction is not an ECM construction, cf. **It's great Sandra to cook dinner.*

a. Lisa likes that you came.
b. It's great that you came.

(9) *For*-clauses:

a. ?Kelly likes for Pearl Jam to play in Baltimore.
b. Kelly is enthusiastic for Pearl Jam to play in Baltimore.

Desideratives take a more restricted range of complements. In particular, they are infelicitous with gerundives, (11), and *that*-clauses, (14), and to a lesser extent *for*-clauses, (15).

(10) Nominals:

a. John wants cookies.
b. John would like cookies.

(11) Gerundives:

a. # David wants going to the store.
b. # David would like going to the store.

(12) Infinitival clauses:

a. Julian wants to say goodbye.
b. Julian would like to say goodbye.

(13) ECM (Acc+Inf):

a. Rachel wants Sandra to cook dinner.
b. Rachel would like Sandra to cook dinner.

(14) *That*-clauses:

a. # Lisa wants that you will come.
b. # Lisa would like that you will come.

(15) *For*-clauses:

a. ??Kelly wants for Pearl Jam to play in Baltimore.
b. ??Kelly would like for Pearl Jam to play in Baltimore.

In terms of selectional properties, it is clear from the examples in (10)-(15) that an evaluative in combination with *would* behaves like a lexical desiderative.

Note that in cases like (11b) and (14b) where the complement type is infelicitous, a counterfactual reading of the modal is prominent. This can be clearly distinguished from the desiderative reading by the felicity of a conditional continuation, (16). When followed by *please*, only a desiderative reading is available, (17). Keep in mind that this paper is only concerned with the desiderative readings of these sentences.

(16) David would like going to the store if he didn't have to worry about parking.

(17) a. #David would like going to the store, please.
b. Julian would like to say goodbye, please.

In this paper we limit our focus to the gerundive examples and the contrast in acceptability for gerundive complements. Recall from (5) and (11) that these are perfectly acceptable with

evaluative predicates, but are generally infelicitous with desiderative predicates.[4] The table in (18) shows the running summary with the addition of these gerundive facts.

(18) Evaluative/desiderative summary 2

predicate	*like*	*would like*	*want*
1. conveys	evaluation	desire	desire
2. gerundive	yes	no	no

The apparent variety in the syntax of complement types for evaluatives and desideratives may not be reflected in semantic variety. A step in this direction is taken in Schwarz (2008)'s partition of intentional transitive verbs (ITVs) into a *look-for*-class and a *need* class. The former, he treats as selecting for a property (cf. Zimmermann, 1993). The latter, he argues, selects a proposition.

The lexical desiderative *want* is a member of this second class, selecting a proposition. Infinitival complements like *I want to read a book*, which have been the focus of analyses of *want* as an attitude predicate (Heim, 1992, von Fintel, 1999, Villalta, 2008), are transparent encodings of propositions. For nominal complements like *I want a book*, we follow Schwarz in positing covert clausal material in the form of a HAVE-clause.

Schwarz points out that surface nominal complements of verbs in this class show attachment ambiguities. One such ambiguity is evident when *want* is modified by an adverbial, as in (19). On one reading, paraphrased in (19a), the adverbial modifies a *wanting* event. On a second reading, shown in (19b), the adverbial modifies an embedded *having* event.

(19) Greta wanted a beer before dinner.
   a. There was a time before dinner at which Greta wanted a beer.
   b. Greta's desire is to have a beer before dinner.

On Schwarz's account these readings correspond to the structures shown in (20).

(20) a. Greta [wanted [PRO HAVE a beer] before dinner] (high attachment)
   b. Greta wanted [[PRO HAVE a beer] before dinner] (low attachment)

Other verbs, even ITVs in the *look-for* class, lack this ambiguity, (21)- (22).

(21) Greta drank a beer before dinner.
   a. only: There was a time before dinner at which Greta drank a beer.

(22) Greta looked for a beer before dinner.
   a. only: There was a time before dinner at which Greta looked for a beer.

Would like shows the same ambiguity in these contexts as *want*. Bare evaluative *like*, however, does not. We can see this parallel between *want* and *would like* in (23) and (24), where the adverbial *too* can attach either high or low. Its presupposition can be satisfied either by a matching *want/would like* or by a matching *have*.

[4] An exception to this generalization is the case of gerundives that act as names, e.g. *I want vacuuming, but you can have it so long as I don't get stuck with cleaning the garage.*

(23) a. John wants a beer, and Greta wants one too. (high)
...Greta [[wants PRO HAVE one] too]
b. John has a beer, and Greta wants one too. (low)
...Greta wants PRO [[HAVE one] too]

(24) a. John would like a beer, and Greta would like one too. (high)
b. John has a beer, and Greta would like one too. (low)

Low attachment of *too* is not available with the evaluative *like*, as seen in (25)[5].

(25) #John has a beer, and Greta likes one too.

We represent this distinction in our running summary with the label *low attachment*. We turn, in the next section, to the lexical desiderative *want*.

(26) Evaluative/desiderative summary 3

predicate	*like*	*would like*	*want*
1. conveys	evaluation	desire	desire
2. gerundive	yes	no	no
3. low attachment	no	yes	yes

3 Desideratives

Here we examine *want* with the aim of characterizing the *would*-desideratives (e.g. *would like*) as more-or-less equivalent to lexical desideratives (e.g. *want*). Specifically, both *would*-desideratives and lexical desideratives entail a preference for their complement to some set of alternatives (Heim 1992, Villalta 2008 inter alia). We call this the *Strict Preference Condition*, or SPC.

(27) Strict Preference Condition (SPC): minimal extensions of the present situation (i.e. the situation assumed to hold at the time of utterance) that include the object of evaluation will be, in the view of the attitude holder, strictly preferable to all contextually available alternatives.[6]

We take the SPC to be the core of the desiderative meaning; it is this that *want* and *would like* require, which bare *like* does not. In light of this, we will rephrase 1. in the summary tables in terms of adherence to the SPC.

[5]Perhaps surprisingly, *Greta likes a cookie before dinner* is felicitous and unambiguously has the second reading: Greta likes [[HAVE a cookie] before dinner]. *Like* appears to allow covert small HAVE-clauses in the presence of a temporal adverbial. This is presumably tied to *like*'s status as a lexical stative and the infelicity of lexical statives with temporal adverbials (cf. *Greta knows Dutch after dinner*). See Zaroukian and Beller (in press) for further discussion.

[6]This pertains to positive cases (*like*, *love*, etc.), which are what we focus on here. For negative cases (*hate*, *abhor*, etc.), preferences are reversed.

(28) Evaluative/desiderative summary 4

predicate	*like*	*would like*	*want*
1. ~~conveys~~ SPC	~~evaluation~~ no	~~desire~~ yes	~~desire~~ yes
2. gerundive	yes	no	no
3. low attachment	no	yes	yes

The lexical predicate (e.g. *like* in *would like*, *be great* in *would be great*) provides justification for the preference. For example, (29) conveys that a cookie is preferred due to the speaker's positive disposition toward them, while in (30) the a pen is preferred due to its utility, and in (31) an apology is preferred due to its fairness in the given situation.

(29) A cookie would be great.

(30) A pen would be useful.

(31) An apology would be fair.

This characterization is similar to that of subjunctive-selecting verbs given in Villalta (2008). On her account, certain verbs (like *want*) select a degree head $\emptyset_{\mathrm{C}}$ that imposes a comparison with alternatives, (32).

(32) $[\![\emptyset_{\mathrm{C}}]\!]^{\mathrm{g}} = \lambda P_{\langle \mathrm{d},\langle \mathrm{st},\langle \mathrm{e},\langle \mathrm{st}\rangle\rangle\rangle\rangle}.\lambda p.\lambda x.\lambda w.\forall q : q \neq p \;\&\; q \in g(C) :$
$max(\lambda d.P(d)(p)(x)(w)) > max(\lambda d'.P(d')(q)(x)(w))$

$[\![\emptyset_{\mathrm{C}}]\!]$ takes a gradable attitude predicate P, a proposition p, an individual x, and a world w, and it returns true if, for all contextually determined alternative propositions q, the degree d to which x holds P toward p in w is greater than the degree d' to which x holds P toward q. In this comparison, $\emptyset_{\mathrm{C}}$ encodes the SPC. The lexical predicate specifies the scale of the comparison, e.g. *want* specifies a scale of desirability, (33).

(33) $[\![\emptyset_{\mathrm{C}}\textbf{-want}]\!]^{\mathrm{g}} = \lambda p.\lambda x.\lambda w.\forall q : q \neq p \;\&\; q \in g(C)$
$max(\lambda d.desirable(d)(p)(x)(w) > max(\lambda d'.desirable(d')(q)(x)(w)$

Our analysis differs from Villalta's in the mechanics and abstracts away from the degree semantics incorporated in her work. The end goal, however, is that sentences with *would* and an evaluative end up with the same truth conditions as Villalta's $\emptyset_{\mathrm{C}}$-selecting verbs, modulo variation in the justification for (or scale of) the comparison. In Section 5 we provide an analysis of **[would like]** that attributes the SPC to the modal element. In the meantime we turn to a discussion of genericity in the bare evaluative predicates.

4 Generics

A further alternation in the behavior of evaluatives becomes apparent when we look at nominal objects of evaluation. Generically-interpreted indefinites are infelicitous as objects of evaluation, as shown in (34a) and (35a), but they are perfectly acceptable in the presence of *would*, as shown in (34b) and (35b).

(34) a. # Sandra likes a cookie. (evaluative)
b. Sandra would like a cookie. (desiderative)

(35) a. # A cookie is great. (evaluative)
b. A cookie would be great. (desiderative)

Generic indefinites are also acceptable with the lexical desiderative *want*.

(36) Sandra wants a cookie

Infelicity with generic indefinites is a familiar property of habitual sentences (e.g. Carlson, 1980, Krifka et al., 1995, Rimell, 2004). Rimell provides an analysis of simple habitual sentences which derives this infelicity through interactions between the scopal properties of the indefinite and a generalization operator over stages of individuals. This generalization operator, identified as a verbal affix, is scopally inert. This contrasts with habitual sentences containing overt quantificational elements (e.g. quantificational adverbs), which she assigns tripartite structures. The logical form of a simple habitual is shown in (37).

(37) Mary drinks beer. (habitual)
$\exists_{\text{sufficient}} y^{s}.R(y^{s},m) \wedge \exists z^{s}.R(z^{s},b) \wedge drink'(z^{s},y^{s})$
'There are sufficient Mary-stages that drink beer-stages to generalize to Mary herself.'

A singular indefinite provides a quantificational element which raises to take high scope, with a logical form like (38). The infelicity in (38) arises from multiple consumptions of a single object.

(38) # Mary drinks a beer. (#habitual)
$\exists x^{o}[beer'(x^{o}) \wedge \exists_{\text{sufficient}} y^{s}.R(y^{s},m) \wedge \exists z^{s}.R(z^{s},x^{o}) \wedge drink'(z^{s},y^{s})]$
'There is a beer such that there are sufficient Mary-stages that drink stages of that beer for us to generalize to Mary herself.'

Although the evaluative sentences are stative, rather than habitual, certain conceptual parallels suggest that a similar analysis in terms of a scope-less generalization operator is appropriate. Most notable for our purposes is that both habitual and stative sentences have something less than universal force ($\exists_{\text{sufficient}}$, not $\forall$). Even if John is not positively disposed toward cookies at every moment, it can still be true that John likes cookies. Conversely, for the sentence to be true there must be some sufficient number of moments in which John *is* so disposed.

We consider habituals and evaluatives individual-level predicates, since they require a generalization over an individual based on sufficient exemplars. This contrasts with desiderative predicates, which involve no such generalization. This stage-level behavior of desideratives can be seen in their felicity with indefinite objects (36), where desiderative predicates do not infelicitously generalize over one object (cookie, beer, etc.). Further support for this view comes from conjoined examples. When an evaluative (individual-level) predicate is conjoined with a potentially contradictory desiderative (stage-level) predicate like *want*, no contradiction arises (40), the same is true if the desiderative is a would-bearing evaluative (41). The expected contradictions, indicated by #, arise when two IL or two SL predicates are conjoined, (39) and (42).

(39) # Sandra likes cookies more than cake, but Sandra likes cake more than cookies.

(40) Sandra likes cookies more than cake, but Sandra wants cake more than cookies.

(41) Sandra likes cookies more than cake, but Sandra would like cake more than cookies.

(42) # Sandra would like cookies more than cake, but Sandra wants cake more than cookies.

The properties that distinguish evaluatives from *would*-desideratives are summarized in (43).

(43) Evaluative/desiderative summary – final

predicate	*like*	*would like*	*want*
1. SPC	no	yes	yes
2. gerundive	yes	no	no
3. low attachment	no	yes	yes
4. generic indefinite	no	yes	yes
5. contradict *want*	no	yes	yes

As previously mentioned we take the strict preference condition to be the characteristic meaning of desideratives. The availability of a gerundive object is tied to the aktionsart of the predicate, which we show in Section 5.6. Following Schwarz (2008), the availability of the low attachment point (i.e. a covert HAVE small clause) is tied to a certain class of intensional transitive predicates which include *would*-desideratives. The availability of a generic indefinite object, and the contradiction when paired with a lexical desiderative, are tied to the individual-level/stage-level distinction.

Compositionally, these properties must all be tied to *would*. We propose in the next section that the key properties of *would* are the introduction of comparison (through subjunctive morphology, cf. Villalta 2008) and its future orientation (e.g. Abusch, 1998, Condoravdi, 2003). This second property restricts the temporal extent of the predicate, forcing a stage-level interpretation. Our thesis in what follows is that desiderativity is what results when an evaluative is forced into this stage-level interpretation.

5 Composing a desiderative

5.1 Preliminaries

Evaluative predicates presuppose that the attitude holder has experienced the object of evaluation. When this presupposition is contradicted by the context, they are infelicitous, (44) (45).[7]

(44) (Sandra has never experienced swimming)
Sandra likes swimming.

(45) (The speaker has never experienced a cookie)
Cookies are great.

Note that the presupposition of experience can be challenged, e.g. by a parent in (46).[8]

(46) child: I don't like lasagna.
parent: But you've never tried it before!

[7] Thanks to Christine Gunlogson for discussion of this point.

[8] This example also shows the presupposition projecting out of negation.

As in Rimell's analysis of habituals, the generic stative meaning arises from an inductive generalization operator *Gen* (=*G* in Carlson, 1980) that does not take sentential scope. We assume for simplicity that this operator is in complementary distribution with the modal auxiliary *would*. This assumption, however, is not crucial to our analysis, as we discuss briefly in Section 5.5.

Would is a future oriented modal. Combining it with an evaluation intersects the temporal duration of the required experience/evaluation event with the interval supplied by the time parameter t. Following Abusch (1998), we take this time parameter to be an interval starting at speech-time and extending forward.

We further assume (following Condoravdi 2003 among others) that *would* is the realization of an abstract morpheme *woll* under non-present or non-indicative morphology. Villalta (2008) argues that in Spanish the subjunctive mood is invovled in comparative meanings. We extend this by assuming that our *would* is under subjunctive morphology, which contributes the SPC.

Our ontology includes the following (cf. Condoravdi, 2003):

(47) D_{v}, a domain of eventualities partially ordered by a subevent relation, $\sqsubseteq$.

(48) T, a set of time intervals ordered a precedence relation, $\prec$, and subinterval relation, $\subseteq$.

(49) A function $duration$ from D_{v} into T, which takes an eventuality and returns its timespan.

On the current analysis the abstract morpheme *woll* takes as its arguments a predicate of eventualities and an eventuality, and returns true just in case the predicate is true of the eventuality, and the duration of that eventuality starts at the speech time and extends into the future. This is shown in (50).

(50) $[\![\textbf{woll}]\!]^{\text{t}} = \lambda P_{\langle \text{vt} \rangle}.\lambda e_{\text{v}}.duration(e) \subseteq [t, +\infty) \;\&\; P(e)$

Our subjunctive morpheme, *SUBJ*, shown in (51), provides the *Strict Preference Condition*. It takes as arguments a predicate of eventualities and an eventuality. *SUBJ* returns true just in case the argument predicate is preferred to all members of the set of alternatives *Alt* that are distinct from it.

(51) $[\![\textbf{SUBJ}]\!]^{\text{t}} = \lambda P_{\langle \text{vt} \rangle}\lambda e_{\text{v}}.\forall Q_{\langle \text{vt} \rangle} : Q \neq P \;\&\; Q \in Alt : P(e) >_{\text{pref}} Q(e)$

Membership in *Alt* is pragmatically determined. Crucially, we assume that *Alt* minimally includes an event representation of the currently observable speech context. This particular predicate in *Alt* will include information about who is participating in the discourse, what (if any) activities participants engaging in, and salient objects in the environment.

Evaluative predicates are properties of events. They take their object of evaluation as an argument. They then take an eventuality argument and assert that the eventuality occurs at or before the time parameter and that the object of evaluation is appropriately evaluated in that event. The adjectival predicate *great* and the verbal predicate *like* are shown in (52) and (53) below.[9]

(52) $[\![\textbf{great}]\!]^{\text{t}} = \lambda x_{\text{e}}.\lambda e_{\text{v}}.duration(e) \preceq t \;\&\; x$ is experienced as great in e.
Defined iff x is experienced in e.

[9] Ultimately we will need to allow both individuals and propositions as objects of evaluation, for simplicity we will restrict our attention to individuals.

(53) $[\![\textbf{like}]\!]^{t} = \lambda x_{e}.\lambda e_{v}.duration(e) \preceq t$ & x is experienced positively in e.
Defined iff x is experienced in e.

Our scopally inert generalization operator is shown in (54).

(54) $[\![\textbf{Gen}]\!] = \lambda P_{\langle vt \rangle}.\lambda e.\exists_{\text{sufficient}} e' : e' \sqsubseteq e$ & $P(e')$.

This takes a property of eventualities and an eventuality as arguments and returns true if there exist sufficient sub-eventualities of the argument eventuality at which the property holds.

Explicit attitude holders are introduced by a VOICE projection (55) which combines with the evaluation through Event Identification (Kratzer, 1996).

(55) $[\![\textbf{holder}]\!] = \lambda x_{e}.\lambda e_{v}.holder(x)(e)$

5.2 Evaluation with a bare plural object

With these pieces in place we can look to the composition of the evaluative sentence in (56). Here the verbal evaluative *like* first composes with the object of evaluation *cookies* and then with functional projections for the generalization operator. The event is identified with that introduced by the voice projection, and then composes with the subject *Sandra*, the explicit attitude holder.

(56) Sandra likes cookies



$[\![\textbf{3}]\!]^{t} = \lambda e_{v}.duration(e) \preceq t$ & $expPos(cookies)(e)$.
$[\![\textbf{2}]\!]^{t} = \lambda e.\exists_{\text{sufficient}} e' : e' \sqsubseteq e$ & $duration(e') \preceq t$ & $expPos(cookies)(e')$.
$[\![\textbf{1}]\!]^{t} = \lambda x_{e}.\lambda e_{v}.holder(x)(e)$ & $\exists_{\text{sufficient}} e' : e' \sqsubseteq e$ & $duration(e') \preceq t$ & $expPos(cookies)(e')$.
$[\![\textbf{S}]\!]^{t} = \exists e_{v}.holder(Sandra)(e)$ & $\exists_{\text{sufficient}} e' : e' \sqsubseteq e$ & $duration(e') \preceq t$ & $expPos(cookies)(e')$.

The eventuality argument is existentially closed at S yeilding the proposition that there is an eventuality, which Sandra is the holder of, and there are sufficient sub-eventualities, whose duration extends no further into the future than the time parameter, in which cookies are experienced positively (presupposing that they are experienced).

5.3 Evaluation with an indefinite object

We assume that an indefinite object is represented in the semantics as a generalized quantifier, a scope taking element. Since the *Gen* operator does not take scope, the indefinite will be the highest element in the structure.

(57) # Sandra likes a cookie.
[a cookie [Sandra [holder [Gen [likes _]]]]]
⟦# Sandra likes a cookie⟧ = $\exists x_{e}.cookie(x)\exists e_{v}.holder(Sandra)(e)$ & $\exists_{\text{sufficient}} e' : e' \sqsubseteq e$ & $duration(e') \preceq t$ & $expPos(x)(e')$.

The resulting reading is that there is a single cookie which Sandra has a sufficient number of positive experiences with. Such specific readings, while possible, are somewhat infelicitous. Just as we typically do not drink the same beer multiple times, neither do we experience the same cookie multiple times; once these objects consumed they are gone.

5.4 Evaluation + *would* = desire report

Above, we proposed that the evaluative predicate introduces a restriction on the temporal extent of the eventuality: it extends no further than the speech time. We now propose that the introduction of the modal imposes a second constraint: the temporal extent of the eventuality extends no earlier than the speech time. The important differences from (56) and (57) are shown in nodes 2 and 3.

(58) Sandra would like cookies



At node 3 the *duration* statements simplify to $duration(e) = t$.
⟦3⟧ = $\lambda e_{v}.duration(e) \subseteq [t, +\infty)$ & $duration(e) \preceq t$ & $expPos(cookies)(e)$.

At node 2, the subjunctive morpheme favorably contrasts the evaluation, *cookies are experienced positively at t*, with all contextually-supplied alternatives. This includes a representation of the speech context in which *cookies are not experienced at t*, which provides the SPC.
⟦2⟧ = $\lambda e_{v}.\forall Q_{\langle vt \rangle} : Q \neq [\lambda e'_{v}.duration(e') = t$ & $expPos(cookies)(e').]$ & $Q \in Alt : [duration(e) = t$ & $expPos(cookies)(e)] >_{\text{pref}} Q(e)$

Crucial for this analysis is the assumption that a speech-context event containing the elements of P (i.e. occurs at t and $expPos(cookies)(e)$) will be indistinguishable from P, making an ordering

impossible. This assumption allows us to correctly predict the infelicity of sentences like (59), where the speech-context predicate Q is indistinguishable from the argument predicate P.

(59) (Situation: John is eating a cookie)
John: # A cookie would be fantastic.

The remaining composition is straightforward.

Note that the lexical desideratives *want* and *wish* (cf. Iatridou, 2000) are more flexible than these *would*-derived desideratives in the SPC (60). This suggests that the SPC is a necessary property of subjunctive *woll* but not of the lexical desideratives.

(60) I live in Bolivia because {I want to/I wish to/*it would be great to} live in Bolivia.

This fits nicely with Iatridou's analysis. With an infinitival complement *wish* lacks the exclusion feature that *would* encodes in its non-present-indicative morphology.

5.5 *Would*-desiderative with an indefinite object

As before, the indefinite object is a scope-taking element, but now *SUBJ*, being a quantificational element, raises as well. When the indefinite takes high scope we again have a specific reading, but we now have available the scope shown in this derivation with *SUBJ* taking highest scope. This gives a reading shown below, i.e. for all alternative eventualities that fail to have Sandra experiencing a cookie positively an eventuality that meets that requirement is preferable.

(61) Sandra would like a cookie.



$[\![\mathbf{1}]\!]^{t} = \exists x_{e}.\lambda e_{v}.cookie(x)$ & $holder(Sandra)(e)$ & $duration(e) = t$ & $expPos(x)(e)$

$[\![\mathbf{S}]\!]^{t} = \lambda e_{v}.\forall Q_{\langle vt\rangle} Q \neq [\exists x_{e}.\lambda e'_{v}.cookie(x)$ & $holder(Sandra)(e')$ & $duration(e') = t$ & $expPos(x)(e')]$ & $Q \in Alt.[\exists x_{e}.cookie(x)$ & $holder(Sandra)(e)$ & $duration(e) = t$ & $expPos(x)(e).] >_{pref} Q(e)$

Because *Gen* is scopeless it forces a specific interpretation for indefinite objects of evaluations. A non-specific reading is available so long as there is some other scope taking element, like *SUBJ*. We mentioned earlier the assumption, reflected in this derivation, that *Gen* is in complementary distribution with *would*. If we reject this position we are left with a requirement for a sufficient number of sub-eventualities where the evaluation holds, with durations restricted to t. As near as we can tell, the reading with a single eventuality restricted to t is indistinguishable from that with sub-eventualities.

5.6 Gerundive objects of evaluation

Recall that bare evaluatives can take gerundives as objects of evaluation, while *would*-bearing evaluatives and desideratives cannot (cf. (5) and (11)).

(62) John likes swimming.

(63) a. #John would like swimming.
b. #John wants swimming.

This contrast can be accounted for if we treat gerundives as introducing an ongoing event. In particular let us require that the representation of a gerundive include a specification that the event started before the interval t, as in (64).

(64) $[\![\textbf{swimming}]\!]^{t} = \lambda e_{v}.t \subseteq duration(e)\ \&\ \exists e' : e' \sqsubset e.\ duration(e') \prec t.\ swimming(e)$

When the *duration* term introduced by the gerundive intersects the time specification given by *woll*, a contradiction arises where the duration of e both *equals* t and *precedes* t, (65).

(65) $duration(e) = t\ \&\ \exists e' : e' \sqsubset e\ \&\ duration(e') \prec t$

6 Summary

(43) Evaluative/desiderative summary – final

predicate	*like*	*would like*	*want*
1. SPC	no	yes	yes
2. gerundive	yes	no	no
3. low attachment	no	yes	yes
4. generic indefinite	no	yes	yes
5. contradict *want*	no	yes	yes

In closing we stress that the strict preference condition, (27), is the characteristic meaning of desideratives. The SPC is supplied in *would*-desideratives by *would* ($[\![\textbf{SUBJ}]\!]$), as in (51). The availability of a gerundive object is tied to the aktionsart of the predicate: the combination of a gerundive with *woll* yeilds a contradiction, (65), such that gerundives are infelicitous with desideratives. The availability of the low attachment point (i.e. a covert HAVE small clause) is tied to a certain class of intensional transitive predicates, which include both *would*-desideratives and *want*, (24). The availability of a generic indefinite object is tied to SUBJ: When SUBJ takes scope over an indefinite object, no specific reading arises, e.g. (57), (61). The contradiction of *would like* when paired with *want* reflects shared status as stage-level predicates, (39)-(42).

Finally, we would like to highlight a prediction of this analysis, namely that future oriented subjunctive modals other than *would* should also give rise to a desiderative meaning of evaluative predicates. This prediction is born out in sentences like (66), where the future-oriented modal *might* combines with the evaluative *like* to yield a desiderative interpretation

(66) a. Sandra might like a cookie.
b. A cookie might be nice.

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